“Gunny” Bob misleadingly criticized “near-total lack of qualifications” of Iraq Study Group members

Newsradio 850 KOA host “Gunny” Bob Newman misleadingly asserted that the Iraq Study Group was unqualified to offer recommendations because it was made up almost entirely of “lawyers and politicians.” In fact, five of the 10 Iraq Study Group members served in the U.S. military and the group consulted with a panel of senior military advisers, as well as with a lengthy list of active-duty military officials.

Asserting that Iraq Study Group (ISG) members lacked military qualifications, Newsradio 850 KOA host “Gunny” Bob Newman asked his guest, retired U.S. Army Colonel David Hunt, “Why should any American accept” the ISG's recently released report “as being something of value?” Newman stated on the December 6 broadcast of his show that the ISG report “is just about as close to being completely worthless as you can get, which is what you should expect, given the near-total lack of qualifications of the 10 group members who comprised it.” In fact, five of the 10 members of the Iraq Study Group served in the U.S. military. Moreover, the ISG was supported by a panel of senior military advisers, and consulted with numerous military and intelligence experts -- including a number with active-duty experience in Iraq -- before issuing its final conclusions on December 5.

In its report, the ISG -- which was charged with providing “a forward-looking, independent assessment of the current and prospective situation on the ground in Iraq and how that affects the surrounding region as well as U.S. interests” -- presented a number of specific recommendations regarding the future of U.S. policy in Iraq. As The New York Times noted, the report “urged stepped-up diplomatic and political efforts to stabilize that country, coupled with a shift in the mission of U.S. forces to allow the United States to 'begin to move its combat forces out of Iraq responsibly.' ”

Throughout the December 6 broadcast, Newman mocked what he characterized as the ISG's lack of military expertise, stating at one point, "[I]f my stove was broken, I would call a stove repairman to fix it, not a politician and not a lawyer."

From the December 6 broadcast of Newsradio 850 KOA's The Gunny Bob Show:

NEWMAN: When you look at -- when you look at the things that we could be doing that we are not doing, this report, when you look at the qualifications, or lack thereof, of the people actually on the board -- and as you pointed out, Robb, a retired Marine Reservist, he's the only one with active-duty combat experience at all, the rest are lawyers and politicians -- and you, you look at this. Why should any American accept this report as being something of value?

[...]

The Iraq Study Group report is out. And they opened the exit door even wider. I've read through the report. It's a hundred and sixty pages long. It is just about as close to being completely worthless as you can get, which is what you should expect, given the near-total lack of qualifications of the 10 group members who comprised it. The report is negligent; it is derelict because of -- because of its approach. It is no more than a way to geopolitically mitigate our retreat and surrender and it does not provide a roadmap to achieve victory -- which, again, was to be expected, given the minimal qualifications of the panel, which consisted 100 percent of lawyers and politicians. It reminded me of the 9-11 Commission, which suffered from the same malady and was doomed to failure because of that.

Contrary to Newman's assertion, five of the 10 members of the ISG have military credentials. According to the ISG website:

  • Co-chairman James A. Baker III served two years of active duty as a lieutenant in the United States Marine Corps
  • Former U.S. Attorney General Edwin Meese III is a retired colonel in the United States Army Reserve
  • Former White House Chief of Staff Leon E. Panetta served as a first lieutenant in the Army from 1964 to 1966 and received the Army Commendation Medal
  • Former Secretary of Defense William J. Perry was an enlisted man in the Army Corps of Engineers from 1946 to 1947 and served in the Army of Occupation in Japan. He joined the Reserve Officer Training Corps in 1948 and was a second lieutenant in the Army Reserves from 1950 to 1955

Additionally, as Washington Business Forward detailed in 1999, ISG member Charles S. Robb -- a former U.S. senator and Virginia governor -- “was a captain in the Marines, first in his class at the Marine Corps Officer's Basic School at Quantico,” and “earn[ed] a bronze star in active duty in Vietnam.”

However, Newman lamented that “Robb, a retired Marine reservist, he's the only one with active-duty combat experience at all, the rest are lawyers and politicians.” Newman later noted that “Meese ... is a retired Army reservist,” and criticized the fact that "[n]ot a single one from the group of members is a seasoned veteran with extensive special operations, counterterrorism, or unconventional warfare experience." Newman then suggested that the ISG “should have been made up -- 100 percent -- retired spec ops and counterterrorism pros with vast experience in the field, leading such operations.”

As the ISG website notes, “The work of the Iraq Study Group is supported by four expert working groups, as well as panel of senior retired military officers.” The site further clarifies that the members of the study group were to “consult with members of Congress and others, including [the] group of retired military officers,” established as the “Military Senior Advisor Panel.” The panel was composed of four retired generals and one retired Navy admiral:

  • Admiral James O. Ellis Jr.
    United States Navy, Retired
  • General John M. Keane
    United States Army, Retired
  • General Edward C. Meyer
    United States Army, Retired
  • General Joseph W. Ralston
    United States Air Force, Retired
  • Lieutenant General Roger C. Schultz Sr.
    United States Army, Retired

In addition to the expert military panel, the ISG also “consulted with 136 people in and out of government before September 19, and 171 people total as it prepared its report.” Included in the ISG's consultation list under the headings “military community” are the following:

  • General Peter Pace -- Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
  • Admiral Edmund Giambastiani -- Vice-Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
  • General John Abizaid -- Commander, United States Central Command
  • General George W. Casey Jr. -- Commanding General, Multi-National Forces Iraq
  • Lt. General James T. Conway -- Director of Operations, J-3, on the Joint Staff
  • Lt. General Peter Chiarelli -- Commander, Multi-national Forces Iraq
  • Lt. General David H. Petraeus -- Commanding General, U.S. Army Combined Arms Center and Fort Leavenworth
  • Lt. General Martin Dempsey -- Commander Multi-National Security Transition Command -Iraq
  • Maj. General Joseph Peterson -- Coalition Police Assistance Training Team
  • Maj. General Richard Zilmer -- Commander, 1st Marine Expeditionary Force
  • Colonel Derek Harvey -- Senior Intelligence Officer for Iraq, Defense Intelligence Agency
  • Lt. Colonel Richard Bowyer -- National War College (recently served in Iraq)
  • Lt. Colonel Justin Gubler -- National War College (recently served in Iraq)
  • Lt. Colonel David Haight -- National War College (recently served in Iraq)
  • Lt. Colonel Russell Smith -- National War College (recently served in Iraq)

In addition to Newman's criticism, Hunt referred to the ISG as a “bunch of old men and one woman.” Apparently referring to the U.S. military and the progress of the Iraq war, Hunt stated, “We seem to not want to fight this insurgency -- poison the wells and do the things that are necessary to get these people's attention.”

From the December 6 broadcast of Newsradio 850 KOA's The Gunny Bob Show:

HUNT: I've been a little bit nervous by seeing all these 10 people, half asleep in the morning, trying to take credit for something. Bunch of old men and one woman -- and I'm a little, you know -- Sandra Day O'Connor was a brilliant jurist, but what the hell does she know about Iraq?

NEWMAN: Well, that's what I'm wondering because -- let me see -- Colonel, if your truck was broken, would you call lawyers and politicians to fix it, or would you call a mechanic?

HUNT: After I ran somebody over I might, but it --

[crosstalk]

NEWMAN: I, I understand.

HUNT: The problem you've got, is everyone knows, the Marines are doing, you know, seven-month tours, Gunny. [unintelligible] And that's a hell of a rotation schedule.

NEWMAN: As the commandant pointed out a week ago.

HUNT: Conway, you know, you got to hand it to Conway, right?

NEWMAN: Right up front.

HUNT: Conway says, Conway -- it's about time we got somebody at the head of some mili -- somebody's service -- I'm glad it's yours -- because you had to put up with “Perfect” Pete Pace and some others, sorry --

NEWMAN: Mm-hmm, mm-hmm, mm-hmm. I know. I understand.

HUNT: -- This guy's -- Conway's a good man, as is Jim Jones.

[...]

NEWMAN: When you look at -- when you look at the things that we could be doing that we are not doing, this report, when you look at the qualifications, or lack thereof, of the people actually on the board -- and as you pointed out, Robb, a retired Marine reservist, he's the only one with active-duty combat experience at all, the rest are lawyers and politicians -- and you, you look at this. Why should any American accept this report as being something of value?

[...]

HUNT: I mean, there are ways of doing this that we seem to refuse. You know, we refuse to put curfews and kill people that break curfews. We seem to not want to fight this insurgency -- poison the wells and do the things that are necessary to get these people's attention.

[...]

NEWMAN: The Iraq Study Group report is out. And they opened the exit door even wider. I've read through the report. It's a hundred and sixty pages long. It is just about as close to being completely worthless as you can get, which is what you should expect, given the near-total lack of qualifications of the 10 group members who comprised it. The report is negligent; it is derelict because of -- because of its approach. It is no more than a way to geopolitically mitigate our retreat and surrender and it does not provide a roadmap to achieve victory -- which, again, was to be expected, given the minimal qualifications of the panel, which consisted 100 percent of lawyers and politicians. It reminded me of the 9-11 Commission, which suffered from the same malady and was doomed to failure because of that.

Listen gang, tell me something: If you were in charge of a massive development project, would you hire veteran construction, mechanical, electrical, and civil engineers to advise you on how to build it -- on how to solve problems and avoid mistakes, or would you hire politicians and lawyers? If you had a massive audit to run on your company because accounting problems were very evident, would you hire CPAs to find the problems and fix them, or would you hire politicians and lawyers? If you are a rancher and your animals were getting sick, would get the veterinarian out there, or would you hire politicians and lawyers? If you ran a nuclear power plant and kept having radiation leaks, would you call a nuclear engineer, or would you call some politicians and lawyers to fix it? If the friggin' paint was peeling off your house, would you call a painter to fix it, or would you call politicians and lawyers? Not a single active-duty career military guy on the entire group. Not one. The closest they come is with Charles Robb, who is a retired Marine reservist, and Ed Meese, who is a retired Army reservist -- neither of whom has any experience in fighting Muslim insurgencies and terrorists. None. Not a single one from the group of members is a seasoned veteran with extensive special operations, counterterrorism, or unconventional warfare experience. Zero.

Given this group's mission, which was to find a way to win the war in Iraq more quickly and efficiently, this board should have been made up -- 100 percent -- retired spec ops and counterterrorism pros with vast experience in the field, leading such operations. Instead, career politicians and lawyers got appointed. Do you see anything wrong with this picture?

[...]

NEWMAN: One of the things that troubled me from the very outset of when the ISG -- the Iraq Study Group -- was actually formed, was it reminded me of how they formed the 9-11 Commission of politicians and lawyers who are unqualified in the realm they were supposed to study and report on. And this group is the same thing. There isn't a single career active-duty military man on the entire ISG. And that's so, I look at that -- granted Charles Robb, a retired Marine Reserve colonel who did some time in Vietnam as a company commander -- I understand he was quite good. And also Ed Meese is a retired Army Reserve colonel -- but when I look at -- those are not in and of themselves qualifications. Then you look at the other eight, and you think, my goodness. I mean, if my -- if my stove was broken, I would call a stove repairman to fix it, not a politician and not a lawyer.