Fox News host Bill O' Reilly suggested President Obama is to blame for the decades-long high unemployment rate among African-Americans, ignoring other factors such as institutionalized racism, even while acknowledging his employers have used affirmative action programs.
A Wall Street Journal op-ed acknowledged the constitutionality of race-conscious law, breaking from the traditional narrative of right-wing media that touts a non-existent "colorblind" Constitution, but incorrectly described the issues in a new Supreme Court case that will examine state bans on affirmative action.
In the case Schuette v. Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action, the Supreme Court has decided to examine whether amendments to state constitutions that ban race-conscious equal opportunity programs violate the 14th Amendment of the U.S. Constitution by impermissibly rigging a state's political process. Contrary to editorial board member James Taranto's description of the case in a recent WSJ op-ed, Schuette is not properly understood as "an opportunity to revist" the constitutionality of affirmative action in higher education admission policies.
Grutter v. Bollinger, which reaffirmed the permissible use of race-conscious admissions in furtherance of the educational benefits of diversity, is indeed at risk in the as-of-yet unreleased decision of Fisher v. University of Texas. Schuette, on the other hand, examines what political means of prohibiting race-conscious admissions are acceptable under the U.S. Constitution and what means unconstitutionally manipulate state political processes to the detriment of persons of color and others who support the use of race-conscious affirmative action.
Fox News host Megyn Kelly defended Johns Hopkins University neurosurgery professor and right-wing media darling Ben Carson's statement linking marriage equality to bestiality by claiming that Supreme Court Justice Sonia Sotomayor made similar comments during oral arguments in the Proposition 8 case, ignoring the broader context of the exchange.
From the March 29 edition of America Live, Kelly said:
But [Carson] is not alone in making comparisons to groups. I mean, when you say, who outside of a man and woman would want to be together? There's not a long list. You struggle to sort of find a group outside of gays and lesbians, and even Justice Sotomayor on the Supreme Court this week, Dan, was asking about would it open the door to polygamy, to incest being allowed. Now gays have gotten very upset before when people compare gay marriage to incestual relationships or polygamist marriages. So did he do something so far afield from what Justice Sotomayor, a Barack Obama appointee on the bench, did in open court this week?
Kelly was referring to an interchange between Justice Sotomayor and counsel for same-sex couples challenging Proposition 8, California's same-sex marriage ban, during oral arguments in Hollingsworth v. Perry on March 26. Kelly's attempt to tie Carson's degrading statement to Justice Sotomayor is misleading. In fact, Justice Sotomayor challenged Proposition 8 supporters' positions.
For example, she asked Charles Cooper, counsel for the Proposition 8 proponents, whether he could name any reason - outside of marriage - "for a State using sexual orientation as a factor in denying homosexuals benefits or imposing burdens on them." When Cooper relied that he could not, Sotomayor followed up:
All right. If that -- if that is true, then why aren't they a class? If they're a class that makes any other discrimination improper, irrational, then why aren't we treating them as a class for this one thing? Are you saying that the interest of marriage is so much more compelling than any other interest as they could have?
In spite of this, Kelly seized upon an exchange between Justice Sotomayor asked Ted Olson, counsel for the plaintiffs, to imply that the Justice, who was appointed by President Obama, shares Carson's opinion that marriage equality could be a "slippery slope" to a parade of horribles:
SOTOMAYOR: Mr. Olson, the bottom line that you're being asked -- and -- and it is one that I'm interested in the answer: If you say that marriage is a fundamental right, what State restrictions could ever exist? Meaning, what State restrictions with respect to the number of people, with respect to - that could get married -- the incest laws, the mother and child, assuming that they are the age -- I can -- I can accept that the State has probably an overbearing interest on -- on protecting a child until they're of age to marry, but what's left?
OLSON: Well, you've said -- you've said in the cases decided by this Court that the polygamy issue, multiple marriages raises questions about exploitation, abuse, patriarchy, issues with respect to taxes, inheritance, child custody, it is an entirely different thing. And if you -- if a State prohibits polygamy, it's prohibiting conduct. If it prohibits gay and lesbian citizens from getting married, it is prohibiting their exercise of a right based upon their status. [[It's selecting them as a class, as you described in the Romer case and as you described in the Lawrence case and in other cases, you're picking out a group of individuals to deny them the freedom that you've said is fundamental, important and vital in this society, and it has status and stature, as you pointed out in the VMI case. There's a -- there's a different - (TR p. 47)
Justice Sotomayor did not challenge him further.
Kelly also failed to acknowledge that Justice Sotomayor was not the one who introduced this line of questioning to the Proposition 8 litigation. Proponents of Proposition 8 included it in their defense of the law:
Extending marriage to same-sex couples could increase the social acceptability of other alternative forms of intimate relationships, such as polygamy or polyamory."
Extending marriages to same-sex couples would increase the likelihood that the recognition as marriages of other alternative forms of intimate relationships, such as polyamory or polygamy, will become a judicially enforceable legal entitlement.
The proponents' Supreme Court brief warned that marriage equality could erode the meaning of marriage, and that "[t]he process of deinstitutionalization could even culminate .... in 'the fading away of marriage,' to the point that it becomes 'just one of many kinds of interpersonal romantic relationships.'
The parties who supported Proposition 8 as amici curiae explicitly warned of a slippery slope to polygamy:
The Conference of Catholic Bishops' brief stated:
Though no party to this litigation argues that multiple friendships and polygamous relationships constitute marriage, it is not evident why they would not also qualify as "marriages" under the Ninth Circuit's novel test. Moreover, if the meaning of marriage is so malleable and indeterminate as to embrace all "lifelong and committed" relationships, then marriage simply collapses as a coherent legal category.
And a brief filed on behalf of 19 states argued:
Once the natural limits that inhere in the relationship between a man and a woman can no longer sustain the definition of marriage, the conclusion that follows is that any grouping of adults would have an equal claim to marriage. See, e.g., Jonathan Turley, One Big, Happy Polygamous Family, NY Times, July 21, 2011 at A27.
Proposition 8 supporters also raised the specter of polygamy in their campaign to pass the constitutional amendment in 2010.
Early in the Supreme Court arguments, Cooper asserted that marriage equality would "redefin[e]" marriage and result in harm.
Further, Justice Antonin Scalia has repeatedly raised this argument to support his position that the Constitution does not bar discrimination against LGBT people or even protect them from being imprisoned for their relationships - which he could use to persuade justices with a less firm position on the case. The justices will consider all of the arguments put forth and the responses to them.
For example, in his dissenting opinion in Romer v. Evans, in which the Court struck down Colorado's law barring legislative, executive, or judicial action that protects persons based on "homosexual, lesbian, or bixexual orientation, conduct, practices or relationships," Scalia wrote (emphasis added):
First, as to its eminent reasonableness. The Court's opinion contains grim, disapproving hints that Coloradans have been guilty of "animus" or "animosity" toward homosexuality, as though that has been established as Unamerican. Of course it is our moral heritage that one should not hate any human being or class of human beings. But I had thought that one could consider certain conduct reprehensible--murder, for example, or polygamy, or cruelty to animals--and could exhibit even "animus" toward such conduct. Surely that is the only sort of "animus" at issue here: moral disapproval of homosexual conduct, the same sort of moral disapproval that produced the centuries old criminal laws that we held constitutional in Bowers.
But there is a much closer analogy, one that involves precisely the effort by the majority of citizens to preserve its view of sexual morality statewide, against the efforts of a geographically concentrated and politically powerful minority to undermine it. The constitutions of the States of Arizona, Idaho, New Mexico, Oklahoma, and Utah to this day contain provisions stating that polygamy is "forever prohibited." See Ariz. Const., Art. XX, par. 2; Idaho Const., Art. I, §4; N. M. Const., Art. XXI, §1; Okla. Const., Art. I, §2; Utah Const., Art. III, §1. Polygamists, and those who have a polygamous "orientation," have been "singled out" by these provisions for much more severe treatment than merely denial of favored status; and that treatment can only be changed by achieving amendment of the state constitutions. The Court's disposition today suggests that these provisions are unconstitutional, and that polygamy must be permitted in these States on a state legislated, or perhaps even local option, basis--unless, of course, polygamists for some reason have fewer constitutional rights than homosexuals.
The Court's stern disapproval of "animosity" towards homosexuality might be compared with what an earlier Court (including the revered Justices Harlan and Bradley) said in Murphy v. Ramsey, 114 U.S. 15 (1885), rejecting a constitutional challenge to a United States statute that denied the franchise in federal territories to those who engaged in polygamous cohabitation.
Scalia again parroted the right-wing parade of horribles message in his dissent from the 2003 Lawrence v. Texas decision, in which the Court struck down a criminal ban on consensual intimate sexual conduct:
State laws against bigamy, same-sex marriage, adult incest, prostitution, masturbation, adultery, fornication, bestiality, and obscenity are likewise sustainable only in light of Bowers' validation of laws based on moral choices. Every single one of these laws is called into question by today's decision;
The Texas statute undeniably seeks to further the belief of its citizens that certain forms of sexual behavior are "immoral and unacceptable," Bowers, supra, at 196-the same interest furthered by criminal laws against fornication, bigamy, adultery, adult incest, bestiality, and obscenity.
Scalia has not restricted this rhetoric to his legal writings. In a December 2012 appearance at Princeton University, a student asked Scalia to defend the language in his Romer and Lawrence dissents. Scalia responded "if we cannot have moral feelings against homosexuality, can we have it against murder? Can we have it against other things?" In defending his statement, Scalia denied that he was comparing homosexuality to murder. He further stated:
I don't apologize for the things I raised. I'm not comparing homosexuality to murder. I'm comparing the principle that a society may not adopt moral sanctions, moral views, against certain conduct. I'm comparing that with respect to murder and that with respect to homosexuality.
Seen in the context of a nearly two-hour oral argument with a long trial record and dozens of amicus briefs, it is unreasonable to suggest that Justice Sotomayor's question demonstrates that she agrees with Carson.
The Wall Street Journal editorial page praised another bitterly split Supreme Court decision in which the conservative justices reached beyond the questions presented to further limit injured consumers' access to justice.
The Court released its decision in Comcast v. Behrend as the historic marriage equality cases were being argued on March 26 and 27, poor timing that resulted in the media largely overlooking the case. Nonetheless, the decision is a significant one and the case is already being described as a sequel to Wal-Mart v. Dukes, another 5-4 decision in which the conservative justices significantly restricted plaintiffs' power to hold corporations accountable for wrongdoing. From the WSJ editorial:
The other news at the Supreme Court on Wednesday was another big defeat for the trial bar. The Justices put a stop to the latest attempt to revive huge legal paydays by ruling 5-4 to reaffirm their requirements for certifying a class action.
In Comcast v. Behrend, the Justices ruled that in order for a class of plaintiffs to be certified they must demonstrate adequate commonality of harm. While the plaintiffs claimed the cable company's monopoly had let it improperly raise prices, the complaints drifted among four disparate theories of liability, with a wide array of potential plaintiffs.
The Comcast and Whirlpool [v. Glazer] cases have made it this far because both the Third and Sixth Circuit Courts of Appeal ignored the Supreme Court's 2011 decision in Wal-Mart v. Dukes that set serious limits on class actions. The current Court has taken much-needed steps to rationalize class certification, and the Justices should make it clear they expect other federal courts to honor the precedents. They should keep taking cases and overturning heedless junior courts until they get the message.
Fox News senior judicial analyst Andrew Napolitano wrongly asserted that the Obama administration's decision to not defend the federal Defense of Marriage Act, which denies same-sex couples more than 1,000 federal benefits and protections, is unprecedented, as previous administrations have also declined to defend statutes they considered unconstitutional.
On March 27, the same day the Supreme Court heard oral arguments in Windsor v. United States, the challenge to DOMA, Napolitano said on Fox's Happening Now:
The president has taken an oath to uphold the law. All the laws, whether he agrees with them or not. But he has forbidden the Justice Department from defending this law.
That's the question, because the government can't write a law for no reason. Every law has to have a rational basis. It has to have some reason. Any reason that makes sense. So the government would have to argue, here's the reason for the law. But the government is not in the courtroom. In fact, President Obama dispatched the government lawyers to argue against this law, which is truly unheard of in my experience.
In fact, there is precedent for refusing to defend a statute. In a letter to Congress explaining the administration's position that DOMA is unconstitutional, Attorney General Eric Holder explained:
[T]he Department in the past has declined to defend statutes despite the availability of professionally responsible arguments, in part because the Department does not consider every plausible argument to be a "reasonable" one. "[D]ifferent cases can raise very different issues with respect to statutes of doubtful constitutional validity," and thus there are "a variety of factors that bear on whether the Department will defend the constitutionality of a statute." Letter to Hon. Orrin G. Hatch from Assistant Attorney General Andrew Fois at 7 (Mar. 22, 1996). This is the rare case where the proper course is to forgo the defense of this statute. Moreover, the Department has declined to defend a statute "in cases in which it is manifest that the President has concluded that the statute is unconstitutional," as is the case here. Seth P. Waxman, Defending Congress, 79 N.C. L.Rev. 1073, 1083 (2001).
In fact, the George W. Bush, Clinton, George H.W. Bush, and Reagan administrations all have declined to defend statutes they concluded were unconstitutional.
As advocates prepare for oral arguments in the challenge to California's Proposition 8 and the federal Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA), the right-wing media, typified by The Wall Street Journal, is wrongly pushing the idea that ruling in favor of same-sex couples would lead to the problems they claim resulted from the Court's Roe v. Wade decision, which struck down laws banning abortions.
Perry v. Hollingsworth, which will be argued on March 26, is a challenge to a California constitutional provision that excludes same-sex couples from marriage. Windsor v. U.S., to be argued March 27, challenges a federal statute, Section 3 of DOMA, which denies married same-sex couples and their families protections and benefits provided to different-sex married couples under federal law.
Some in the right-wing media have taken this opportunity to push a parade of falsehoods about marriage equality. For example, after Sen. Rob Portman (R-OH) announced his support for marriage equality, which he attributed to having an out gay son, WND editor Joseph Farah wrote "I guess we should all be grateful Rob Portman's son didn't choose to become a polygamist or a serial killer." Fox News contributor Cal Thomas promoted the same myth that marriage equality leads to polygamy.
However, with support for marriage equality rapidly on the rise, this faulty logic is not likely to persuade a majority of Americans or of the justices. The right-wing media have pivoted to another scare tactic: if the Court strikes down democratically-enacted laws, then the country will have a political and cultural backlash similar to the one they say the Court unleashed in Roe v. Wade, which struck down abortion bans 40 years ago.
Radio host Rush Limbaugh attempted to draw this comparison between Roe and the gay marriage cases. On the March 25 edition of his radio show, Limbaugh claimed that the reason "abortion so roils our culture is that it hasn't been democratically decided. The Supreme Court, nine people in black robes just decided one day that abortion is in the Constitution, and that has led to constant acrimony."
Former federal Judge Michael McConnell invoked a similar argument when he wrote in an op-ed for The Wall Street Journal:
We learned from Roe v. Wade that the Supreme Court endangers its own legitimacy and exacerbates social conflict when it seeks to resolve moral-legal questions on which the country is deeply divided without a strong basis in the text of the Constitution. The court sometimes intervenes when the legislatures of the 50 states are approaching a consensus. When it jumps into a live political controversy, the justices look like they are acting like legislators.
A March 25 Wall Street Journal editorial states that "the two cases before the High Court are less about the institution of marriage than the sanctity of democratic institutions and the proper role of the courts." It warns against the Justices interrupting "the give-and-take on contentious moral and social issues the Constitution is designed to encourage." It compares this possibility to abortion:
The Supreme Court does not have a good record legislating cultural change. A ruling on behalf of same-sex marriage could enshrine Hollingsworth and Windsor with Roe v. Wade, the 1973 abortion decision that imposed a judicial diktat even as laws in many states were liberalizing. Instead of finding a rough consensus inside the political mainstream, abortion became an all-or-nothing combat that still rages.
This characterization of abortion laws 40 years ago is flatly inaccurate. As Linda Greenhouse, a veteran Supreme Court writer and lecturer at Yale Law School, and Yale Law Professor Reva Siegel wrote,
Before Roe, despite broad popular support, liberalization of abortion law had all but come to a halt in the face of concerted opposition by a Catholic-led minority. It was, in other words, decidedly not the case that abortion reform was on an inevitable march forward if only the Supreme Court had stayed its hand.
After Roe: The entanglement of abortion in party realignment explains how, over time, Republicans and Democrats came to switch position on the abortion issue, leaders before base, and assume their current polarized positions on abortion, an evolution that took nearly twenty years after the Court handed down Roe. Our paper argues that when you line up the evidence, political realignment better explains the timing and shape of political polarization around abortion than does a court-centered story of backlash.
To the question of whether one can avoid conflict over such issues by avoiding courts, the answer from an accurate pre-history of Roe v. Wade is: no. The abortion conflict escalated before the Supreme Court ruled.
And because a strong majority of Americans believes that Roe should not be overturned, Roe might not be a particularly persuasive cautionary tale.
The Wall Street Journal has a long record of hostility toward the regulatory authority of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), but its editorial board recently praised the Supreme Court's near-unanimous decision upholding EPA action in Decker v. Northwest Environmental Defense Center.
In Decker, environmental groups challenged the EPA's interpretation of its rules that regulate the proper permitting of storm water runoff, pursuant to the Clean Water Act. According to the EPA, its regulations had never intended to require logging companies to secure federal permits for the runoff from logging roads. While the case was under consideration by the Supreme Court, the EPA issued new regulations re-confirming this interpretation and exemption practice. The Court decided in a 7-1 decision, with conservative Justice Antonin Scalia dissenting, that well-established administrative law required deference to the EPA's position.
In an editorial titled "Supreme Liberal Washout: The Justices unite against the trial bar and overzealous greens" the WSJ editorial board championed the decision and the EPA. This is a stark change for the WSJ, which is typically incessantly defamatory toward the EPA's actions and legitimacy as "a politically driven bureaucracy that wants to impose by illegal diktat" environmental law. In January, the WSJ editorial board informed its readers that the EPA's interpretation of its authority in regulating storm water was so bad that "[i]f Washington gave awards for creative regulatory overreach, the Environmental Protection Agency would sweep the field." Nevertheless, in the Decker case, the WSJ applauded the EPA's judgment and the Court's opinion.
National Review Online misrepresented the conclusions of a recent Department of Justice (DoJ) Office of the Inspector General (OIG) report on current hiring practices in the department's Voting Section in order to join the right-wing assault on the Labor Secretary nomination of Assistant Attorney General for Civil Rights Thomas Perez.
NRO's aversion to the effective enforcement of civil rights law is well-established and the outlet's wish that precedent in this area is overturned has been repeatedly stated. In addition to Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act and affirmative action, NRO has also expressed its dislike for the currently constitutional "disparate impact" doctrine. This doctrine proves impermissible discrimination against protected groups by demonstrating the disproportionate effects of challenged policies and laws, an evidence-based approach that has drawn the NRO's particular ire in the area of fair housing. A recent NRO post attempted to recycle these attacks as new ones on Perez by observing not many conservatives go to work for DoJ's Civil Rights Division (CRD).
The NRO accuses Perez of dismissing the fact that not enough conservatives serve in the Voting Section - a "disparate impact" - even though Perez enforces "disparate impact" law against banks that impermissibly discriminated against communities of color.
Fox News and Fox Business are butchering civil rights precedent and the Voting Rights Act (VRA) in their continued campaign to suggest President Obama's nominee for Labor Secretary, Assistant Attorney General for Civil Rights Thomas Perez, doesn't want to protect white people.
Following the pre-existing practice of smearing President Obama and his administration as hostile to whites and biased toward people of color, Fox has joined right-wing media in attacking Perez for his enforcement of long-standing civil rights law and advocacy for Hispanic immigrants. This right-wing campaign against Perez has focused on the Civil Rights Division (CRD), which under Perez's supervision has been very effective at using the VRA to protect historical victims of voter suppression.
The Wall Street Journal is joining the right-wing campaign against President Obama's nominee for Secretary of Labor, Assistant Attorney General for Civil Rights Thomas Perez, by uncritically pushing the unsubstantiated claim that Perez improperly colluded with the City of St. Paul, Minnesota, to withdraw a Supreme Court civil rights case.
In reporting on President Obama's official nomination of Perez to head the Department of Labor, the WSJ repeated the claim that Perez inappropriately interfered with Magner v. Gallagher, a Supreme Court civil rights case that could have provided the conservative justices with an opportunity to strike down decades of civil rights precedent. Specifically, although the City of St. Paul has clearly stated it withdrew Magner v. Gallagher because it feared a split Court might use it to strike down the established practice of proving discrimination by showing the racial effects of challenged policies - "disparate impact" litigation - the WSJ uncritically repeated the allegation that Perez was improperly involved. From the WSJ:
The nomination of Mr. Perez as labor secretary comes as some congressional Republicans have raised questions about his alleged involvement in the Justice Department's decision to stay out of two lawsuits against St. Paul, Minn., in which private plaintiffs alleged the city defrauded the U.S. in its use of housing funds.
Republicans have questioned whether the Justice Department stayed out of those cases in exchange for St. Paul dropping an appeal pending at the Supreme Court in a case that civil-rights advocates had feared would undercut enforcement of U.S. housing-discrimination law.
Fox News is using its lack of knowledge about the Voting Rights Act and basic civil rights law to smear the nomination of Assistant Attorney General for Civil Rights Thomas Perez for Secretary of Labor.
The Voting Rights Act (VRA) and Section 5, a provision within the law that requires jurisdictions with a history of racial discrimination in voting practices to submit election changes for federal review, has been a source of difficulty for Fox News. On the March 14 edition of America Live, Fox News host Megyn Kelly and frequent guest Jay Sekulow attacked Perez by incorrectly describing the role of race in race-conscious civil rights law, such as the VRA. In the lengthy segment about the Voting Section - a Department of Justice (DOJ) section under Perez's supervision - Kelly misrepresented a recent Inspector General report and allowed Sekulow to question Perez's competence even as he mangled civil rights law by insisting the Voting Rights Act is "colorblind."
National Review conservative legal commentator Ed Whelan attempts to pick apart the plaintiffs' briefs in Hollingsworth v. Perry, the challenge to California's anti-marriage equality Proposition 8 that the Supreme Court will hear on March 26, by recycling anti-gay smears fueled by the right-wing media that gay marriage is harmful and sexual orientation is not permanent.
Whelan's series of posts, which criticize the plaintiffs' brief and attempt to catch Supreme Court litigators David Boies and Ted Olson distorting facts and testimony, baselessly assert that recognizing same-sex couples' right to marry causes harm, and that in spite of scientific consensus and the experience of millions of same-sex couples, the permanence of their sexual orientation is up for debate.
In his three posts, Whelan sets out fourteen points from the plaintiffs' brief that he identifies as myths and distortions. In his most recent post he attempts to debunk the fact that sexual orientation is a stable characteristic (in other words, disputing whether gay people, per se, exist at all) by stating, "Ample trial evidence demonstrates the lack of scientific support for the notion that homosexuality is a trait that a person is born with." Meanwhile, the amicus brief submitted by the American Psychological Association, the American Medical Association, The American Psychiatric Association, and several other organizations note that "scientific evidence strongly supports the conclusion that homosexuality is a normal expression of human sexuality."
Whelan claims that the plaintiffs' own expert - Professor Gregory Herek - acknowledged that "sexual orientation ... may vary throughout the course of a lifetime." However, a comprehensive reading of his testimony complicates this response. Herek, a psychology professor at University of California Davis, testified at length about the challenges of defining sexual orientation, and acknowledged that by the model in the study proponents cited - which defined sexual orientation as the "cumulative experiences of interaction of erotic fantasy, romantic-emotional feelings, and sexual behavior directed toward one or both genders" [[,]] - it is accurate to say that sexual orientation may vary
Herek's response was not based on his own, or the plaintiffs' own, conception of sexual orientation.
In support of his argument that sexual orientation is not an immutable trait, Whelan continued to take Herek's testimony out of context by focusing on his statement that "we don't really understand the origins of sexual orientation in men or women." However, a comprehensive reading of his testimony demonstrates that it in response to the question, "Do people choose their sexual orientation, Herek asserted "they have experienced no choice or very little choice about that.
Whelan also recycles the right-wing myth that extending marriage rights to same-sex couples causes harm. In point 6, for example, Whelan takes issue with plaintiffs' statements that the Proposition 8 proponents "never identified a single harm that they, or anyone else, would suffer as a result of allowing gay men and lesbians to marry" and that plaintiffs claim that "Proponents suggest no reason to believe - indeed, they make no argument at all - that prohibiting same-sex couples from entering relationships designated 'marriage' will make it more likely that heterosexual couples in California will marry."
In response, Whelan claims that "the testimony and volumes of documentary evidence that Prop 8 proponents offered at trial" show that allowing for same sex marriage would ultimately result in the "deinstitutionalization" of marriage.
The assertion is not responsive to the plaintiffs' argument--there was no evidence that Proposition 8 would deter heterosexuals from marrying.
In his next attempt to identify a harm that would result from marriage equality, Whelan takes issue with the plaintiffs' statement that the proponents produced no data or studies "tending to show" that marriage equality causes harm. In response, he again uses one of the plaintiffs' experts, Professor Lee Badgett, to cite an accelerated long-term decline in the marriage rate of the Netherlands, the first country to redefine marriage in 2001.
The problem is that the facts do not show, nor did Badgett testify, that marriage equality caused the decline in marriage in the Netherlands. At trial, Badgett was asked to read a passage from a defense expert's deposition, which she did:
"In the Netherlands the total number of heterosexual marriages has slowly fallen since the introduction of same-sex marriage. Like most western countries, this is no doubt part of a larger secular trend." (emphasis added).
On cross-examination, Badgett again made clear that data on the number of different-sex marriages in the Netherlands "doesn't tell you anything about what the impact of allowing same-sex couples to marry is."
Badgett has stated her position in previous writings. In a 2004 article criticizing an analysis by Stanley Kurtz that sparked the myth that same-sex marriage affected marriage and unwed births in Europe, Badgett wrote:
Kurtz is also mistaken in maintaining that gay unions are to blame for changes in heterosexual marriage patterns. In truth, the shift occurred in the opposite direction: Changes in heterosexual marriage made the recognition of gay couples more likely. In my own recent study conducted in the Netherlands, I found that the nine countries with partnership laws had higher rates of unmarried cohabitation than other European and North American countries before passage of the partner-registration laws. In other words, high cohabitation rates came first, gay partnership laws followed.
Whelan also challenges thefollowing statement in plaintiffs brief:
"[W]hen the district court asked [proponents'] counsel point blank what harm would come to opposite-sex married couples if gay men and lesbians could marry, Proponents' counsel mustered only 'I don't know. I don't know.'" Brief at 45.
He claimed that the plaintiffs misrepresented thecomment and included the full quotation from the trial transcript, as set forth in Whelan's own amicus brief:
[T]he state and its electorate are entitled, when dealing with radical proposals for change, to a bedrock institution such as this to move with incrementally, to move with caution, and to adopt a wait-and-see attitude.
Keep in mind, your Honor, this same-sex marriage is a very recent innovation. Its implications of a social and cultural nature, not to mention its impact on marriage over time, can't possibly be known now.
Whelan goes on to state that the proponents did not have to prove harm at that stage of the proceedings, but this does not support his statement that the quote in plaintiffs' brief misrepresents what counsel said.
It is not surprising that Whelan would ground his criticism of the plaintiffs' brief in the right-wing myth that marriage equality is harmful. In fact, he employed the right-wing slippery slope argument at a Senate Judiciary Committee hearing on the Respect for Marriage Act, which would repeal the Defense of Marriage Act. He claimed that "The principles invoked by advocates of same-sex marriage in their ongoing attack on traditional marriage threaten to pave the way for polygamous and other polyamorous unions."
His attempt to bolster his sole legal argument--that the Court's prior cases on the fundamental right to marry does not apply to same-sex marriage, through inaccurate characterizations of sexual orientation and the impact of marriage equality--doesn't hold water.
Right-wing media are again alleging that President Obama's potential Department of Labor nominee, Assistant Attorney General for Civil Rights Thomas Perez, may have committed perjury in connection with the right-wing's New Black Panther Party voter intimidation non-scandal. But the internal Department of Justice (DOJ) report that they are citing to support these claims actually (once again) debunks these accusations.
The right-wing claim that political appointees within the Department of Justice (DOJ) improperly directed the outcome of the New Black Panther Party fiasco has already been repeatedly disproven, most notably by DOJ's Office of Professional Responsibility (OPR) and now by DOJ's Office of the Inspector General (OIG). The discredited accusation, initiated by right-wing activist J. Christian Adams, was revived in 2012 by his discredited associate, Hans Von Spakovsky, after a federal judge awarded attorney's fees to a conservative advocacy group that had obtained emails relating to this case through a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request. Von Spakovsky immediately analyzed the opinion, saying of statements from the judge relating to Perez's 2010 testimony on the New Black Panther Party case to the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights:
But what is most disturbing about this court order is that it strongly suggests that Assistant Attorney General Thomas Perez essentially lied in sworn testimony... A less diplomatic judge might have said that Perez testified falsely in his hearing testimony before the Commission on Civil Rights. In other words, he may have committed perjury if he knew his statements were false when uttered.
Now that Perez's Labor nomination is being floated and following the release of the Inspector General's review of the Justice Department's Voting Section (which is overseen by Perez), National Review Online columnist John Fund revived Von Spakovsky's accusation, calling the 2010 testimony "clear dishonesty." Describing Perez as "loathsome," the American Spectator likewise informs its readers (again) Perez "may have committed perjury[.]"
Wall Street Journal columnist Peggy Noonan attempted to join other right-wing media in attacking a New Republic article on Republican nullification efforts, but failed to address the article's main points in her rebuttal.
Noonan skips over the substance of the article to instead misrepresent the controversy around photo voter IDs and ignores the fact that rejections of federal authority through an appeal to "states' rights" are now commonplace in the Republican Party. This increase in attempts at nullification extend from unconstitutional state laws to filibusters of President Obama's nominees.
The article Noonan criticizes, "Why The GOP Is And Will Continue To Be The Party Of White People" by Sam Tanenhaus, argues that the Republican Party has built itself on the myth that states can lawfully resist federal laws with which they disagree. Rather than engage the theory - a concept that originated with John Calhoun's resistance to anti-slavery efforts - Noonan dismisses the argument because she never hears this 19th-century originator of nullification mentioned by name in conservative circles.
Instead, Noonan completely mischaracterizes the recent Republican push for government-issued photo voter ID, which is one of Tanenhaus' examples of the GOP's embrace of nullification. Contrary to Noonan's description, which explains that "vote rigging is part of our history" and "vote fraud happens," these laws are redundant and unnecessary layers of additional identification for a problem of in-person voter impersonation that is virtually non-existent.
Rush Limbaugh recently bragged that conservative Justice Antonin Scalia should be "honored to be compared" to the radio host for disparaging the Voting Rights Act as a "perpetuation of racial entitlement" during the Shelby County v. Holder oral arguments. Other conservative justices also repeated right-wing media talking points as they considered the fate of this historic civil rights law.
Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act requires jurisdictions with a history of racially-based voter suppression to "pre-clear" election changes with federal officials or judges. By dismissing as a "perpetuation of racial entitlement" the fact that a bipartisan majority in Congress voted to reauthorize the law in 2006 - after reviewing thousands of pages of evidence that race-based threats to voting rights still exists in the covered jurisdictions - Scalia adopts the arguments of right-wing media.